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103 changes: 103 additions & 0 deletions gems/devise/CVE-2026-40295.yml
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---
gem: devise
cve: 2026-40295
ghsa: jp94-3292-c3xv
url: https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/security/advisories/GHSA-jp94-3292-c3xv
title: Devise has an Open Redirect via Unvalidated `request.referrer`
in Timeoutable Session Timeout Handler
date: 2026-05-08
description: |
## Summary

When the `Timeoutable` module is enabled in Devise, the
`FailureApp#redirect_url` method returns `request.referrer` — the
HTTP `Referer` header, which is attacker-controllable — without
validation for any non-GET request that results in a session timeout.
An attacker who hosts a page with an auto-submitting cross-origin
form can cause a victim with an expired Devise session to be
redirected to an arbitrary external URL. This contrasts with the
GET timeout path (which uses server-side `attempted_path`) and
Devise's own `store_location_for` mechanism (which strips external
hosts via `extract_path_from_location`), both of which are protected;
only the non-GET timeout redirect path is unprotected.

## Details

The vulnerable code is in `lib/devise/failure_app.rb`:

```ruby
def redirect_url
if warden_message == :timeout
flash[:timedout] = true if is_flashing_format?

path = if request.get?
attempted_path # safe: server-side value from warden options
else
request.referrer # UNSAFE: HTTP Referer header, attacker-controlled
end

path || scope_url
else
scope_url
end
end
```

This is passed directly to `redirect_to`:

```ruby
def redirect
store_location!
# ...
redirect_to redirect_url # redirect_url may be an external attacker URL
end
```

The GET timeout path uses `attempted_path`, which is set server-side
by Warden and cannot be influenced by the client. The `store_location!`
method also only runs for GET requests, so no session-based protection
is applied on POST timeouts.

By contrast, Devise's `store_location_for` method (used elsewhere)
correctly sanitizes URLs via `extract_path_from_location`, which
strips the scheme and host.

## Impact

- Victims with expired sessions who click any attacker-crafted link
or visit an attacker page with an auto-submitting form are redirected
to an arbitrary external URL.
- The redirect happens transparently via a trusted domain (the target
app's domain), bypassing browser phishing warnings.
- An attacker can redirect victims to a fake login page to harvest
credentials (phishing), or to malicious download sites.

_Note_: Rails' built-in open-redirect protection does not mitigate
this issue. `Devise::FailureApp` is an `ActionController::Metal`
app with its own isolated copy of the relevant redirect configuration,
so `config.action_controller.action_on_open_redirect = :raise` (and
the older `raise_on_open_redirects` setting) do not reach it.

## Patches

This is patched in Devise v5.0.4. Users should upgrade as soon as possible.

## Workaround

None beyond upgrading. If an upgrade is not immediately possible, the
same changes from the patch commit can be applied as a monkey-patch
in a Rails initializer (`Devise::FailureApp#redirect_url` and
`Devise::Controllers::StoreLocation#extract_path_from_location`).
Remove the monkey-patch after upgrading.
cvss_v3: 6.1
patched_versions:
- ">= 5.0.4"
related:
url:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-40295
- https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/releases/tag/v5.0.4
- https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/blob/v5.0.4/CHANGELOG.md#504---2026-05-08
- https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/commit/9ea459de9aec5f1217ad738c58e0d23fb9f5beaa
- https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/commit/025fe2124f9928766fc46520e999633b598d0360
- https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/security/advisories/GHSA-jp94-3292-c3xv
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jp94-3292-c3xv
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