Conversation
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This should be merged. |
I'm not sure about that. I remember once I ran into a strange problem with Apache 2.4. I made a fix but haven't sent any PR yet. Here is the commit: I suggest to add this, instead of replace the variable. |
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The correct fix is always use Yours does a costly parsing that doesn't make sense in this scenario. Another extra check that could be done is adding limits to the size you are printing out. |
In my mentioned commit I also used
I'm not sure about that.
The point is not the size limit. The point is this: // add % escape to avoid the '%' chars placeholder mark in logmsgIf the message contains a |
@airween Of course. That's the exact definition of a format string vulnerability. Please read the attack and the solution. The way of solving it is always the same: use |
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Here we can see the function signature. |
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Hi, I'm the person who proposed this patch. I've been reading your posts these past few days and I'm not sure if you're aware that this project isn't being maintained. Look comment about it here |
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Ah, I didn't remember that |
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Hi @Devstellar. Well, @airween is the new project leader for ModSecurity. I guess if you start pushing changes now, he might take a look. Every change is welcome. |
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@Devstellar See https://modsecurity.org/developers/. You are welcome to get onboard. 😄 |
Yep, thank you!
I think I ran into the same problem in 2019 (see this), but as I wrote above, I didn't realized then that
We focus to other issues which appear in the library and in Nginx connector. We don't want to ignore this connector, but we lack of resources. |

Fix issue #85 using a fixed format string in the calls to log