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japertechnology wants to merge 1853 commits intojaper-technology:mainfrom
openclaw:main
Open

Cool!#26
japertechnology wants to merge 1853 commits intojaper-technology:mainfrom
openclaw:main

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Summary

Describe the problem and fix in 2–5 bullets:

  • Problem:
  • Why it matters:
  • What changed:
  • What did NOT change (scope boundary):

Change Type (select all)

  • Bug fix
  • Feature
  • Refactor
  • Docs
  • Security hardening
  • Chore/infra

Scope (select all touched areas)

  • Gateway / orchestration
  • Skills / tool execution
  • Auth / tokens
  • Memory / storage
  • Integrations
  • API / contracts
  • UI / DX
  • CI/CD / infra

Linked Issue/PR

  • Closes #
  • Related #

User-visible / Behavior Changes

List user-visible changes (including defaults/config).
If none, write None.

Security Impact (required)

  • New permissions/capabilities? (Yes/No)
  • Secrets/tokens handling changed? (Yes/No)
  • New/changed network calls? (Yes/No)
  • Command/tool execution surface changed? (Yes/No)
  • Data access scope changed? (Yes/No)
  • If any Yes, explain risk + mitigation:

Repro + Verification

Environment

  • OS:
  • Runtime/container:
  • Model/provider:
  • Integration/channel (if any):
  • Relevant config (redacted):

Steps

Expected

Actual

Evidence

Attach at least one:

  • Failing test/log before + passing after
  • Trace/log snippets
  • Screenshot/recording
  • Perf numbers (if relevant)

Human Verification (required)

What you personally verified (not just CI), and how:

  • Verified scenarios:
  • Edge cases checked:
  • What you did not verify:

Compatibility / Migration

  • Backward compatible? (Yes/No)
  • Config/env changes? (Yes/No)
  • Migration needed? (Yes/No)
  • If yes, exact upgrade steps:

Failure Recovery (if this breaks)

  • How to disable/revert this change quickly:
  • Files/config to restore:
  • Known bad symptoms reviewers should watch for:

Risks and Mitigations

List only real risks for this PR. Add/remove entries as needed. If none, write None.

  • Risk:
    • Mitigation:

gumadeiras and others added 30 commits February 26, 2026 05:38
…ch API

The web_search tool was not respecting HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY environment
variables, causing 'fetch failed' errors when running behind a proxy.

This fix adds ProxyAgent support for the Brave Search API, similar to how
other tools in OpenClaw handle proxy configuration.

Fixes #27405
… thanks @widingmarcus-cyber)

Co-authored-by: Marcus Widing <widing.marcus@gmail.com>
…nks @widingmarcus-cyber)

Co-authored-by: Marcus Widing <widing.marcus@gmail.com>
…hanks @Crpdim)

Co-authored-by: Crpdim <crpdim@users.noreply.github.com>
…count mode (#27244)

The bitable tool registration was reading credentials directly from
top-level feishuCfg.appId/appSecret, missing the accounts.* path used
in multi-account mode. Align with drive.ts and wiki.ts by using
listEnabledFeishuAccounts() which handles both legacy and multi-account
configurations.
Previously feishu_doc always used accounts[0], so multi-account setups created docs under the first bot regardless of the calling agent.

This change resolves accountId via a before_tool_call hook (defaulting from agentAccountId) and selects the Feishu client per call.

Fixes #27321
… of separate agent turn

When the sender-name lookup fails with a Feishu permission error (code
99991672), the bot was dispatching two separate agent turns:

  1. A dedicated permission-error notification turn
  2. The regular inbound user message turn

This caused two bot replies for a single user message, degrading UX and
wasting tokens.

Fix: instead of a separate dispatch, append the permission error notice
directly to the main messageBody. The agent receives both the user's
message and the system notice in a single turn, and responds once.

Fixes #27372
AytuncYildizli and others added 30 commits February 26, 2026 18:51
The config schema validates provider api fields against ModelApiSchema,
but openai-codex-responses was missing from the allowed values. This
forces users to set api: "openai-responses" for the openai-codex
provider, which routes requests to api.openai.com/v1/responses instead
of chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex/responses, causing HTTP 401 errors
because Codex OAuth tokens lack api.responses.write scope for the
standard OpenAI Responses endpoint.

The runtime already supports openai-codex-responses throughout: model
registry, stream dispatch (streamOpenAICodexResponses), and provider
detection (OPENAI_MODEL_APIS set). Only the config schema was missing
the literal.
Fixes #27674

The TUI was erasing already-streamed assistant text when tool calls
were triggered. This happened because the finalize() method in
TuiStreamAssembler was not using the protectBoundaryDrops option
when updating run state.

Now finalize() applies the same boundary drop protection as
ingestDelta(), ensuring that streamed text before tool calls is
preserved when the final payload drops earlier content blocks.
… dispatch

Several call sites of deliverOutboundPayloads() were not passing the
sessionKey parameter, causing the internal message:sent hook to never
fire (the guard `if (!sessionKeyForInternalHooks) return` in deliver.ts
silently skipped the triggerInternalHook call).

Fixed call sites:
- commands/agent/delivery.ts (agent loop replies — main fix)
- infra/heartbeat-runner.ts (heartbeat OK + alert delivery)
- infra/outbound/message.ts (message tool sends)
- cron/isolated-agent/delivery-dispatch.ts (cron job delivery)
- gateway/server-node-events.ts (node event forwarding)

The sessionKey parameter already existed in DeliverOutboundPayloadsCoreParams
and was used by deliver.ts to emit the message:sent internal hook event,
but was simply not being passed from most callers.
…t fallbacks (#16684)

* fix(gemini-oauth): align loadCodeAssist metadata and endpoint fallback

* test(gemini-oauth): cover endpoint fallback and env project fallback

* fix(gemini-oauth): route timed fetches through ssrf guard

* test(gemini-oauth): mock guarded fetch in oauth tests
…Auth and docs (#16683)

* docs: add account-risk caution to Google OAuth provider docs

* docs(plugin): add Gemini CLI account safety caution

* CLI: add risk hint for Gemini CLI auth choice

* Onboarding: require confirmation for Gemini CLI OAuth

* Tests: cover Gemini CLI OAuth risk confirmation flow
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