[GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj] Tekton Pipelines controller panic via long resolver name in TaskRun/PipelineRun

advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj/GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj.json

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.4.0",
   "id": "GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj",
-  "modified": "2026-03-17T19:46:29Z",
+  "modified": "2026-03-17T19:46:30Z",
   "published": "2026-03-17T19:46:29Z",
   "aliases": [
     "CVE-2026-33022"
   ],
   "summary": "Tekton Pipelines controller panic via long resolver name in TaskRun/PipelineRun",
-  "details": "### Summary\n\nA user with permission to create or update a TaskRun or PipelineRun can crash the Tekton Pipelines controller by setting `.spec.taskRef.resolver` (or `.spec.pipelineRef.resolver`) to a string of 31 characters or more, causing a denial of service for all reconciliation.\n\n### Details\n\nThe controller panics in `GenerateDeterministicNameFromSpec` when building a deterministic `ResolutionRequest` name. The generated name has the format `{resolver}-{hash}` and, when the resolver name is long enough, the result exceeds the DNS-1123 label limit of 63 characters.\n\nThe truncation logic attempts to find a word boundary using `strings.LastIndex(name, \" \")`. Since the generated name never contains spaces (it is composed of the resolver name, a dash, and a hex-encoded hash), `LastIndex` returns `-1`, which is then used as a slice bound:\n\n```go\nreturn name[:strings.LastIndex(name[:maxLength], \" \")], nil\n// strings.LastIndex returns -1 → panic: slice bounds out of range [:-1]\n```\n\nThe panic crashes the controller. Because the offending TaskRun or PipelineRun is re-reconciled on restart, the controller enters a `CrashLoopBackOff`, blocking all TaskRun and PipelineRun reconciliation cluster-wide until the offending resource is manually deleted.\n\nBuilt-in resolvers use short names (`git`, `cluster`, `bundles`, `hub`) and are not affected under normal usage. The vulnerability is exploitable by any user who can create TaskRuns or PipelineRuns with a custom resolver name.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Denial of service** — A single malicious TaskRun or PipelineRun with a long resolver name is sufficient to crash the Tekton Pipelines controller into a restart loop, blocking all CI/CD reconciliation cluster-wide until the resource is removed.\n\n### Patches\n\n_(to be filled in: e.g. \"Fixed in versions 1.10.1, 1.9.1, ...\")_\n\nThe fix computes the hash first, then truncates only the prefix (resolver name) to fit within the DNS-1123 label limit, preserving the full hash to maintain determinism and uniqueness of `ResolutionRequest` names.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict who can create TaskRun and PipelineRun resources via Kubernetes RBAC. There is no validation-side workaround without patching.\n\n### Affected Versions\n\nAll releases from **v0.60.0** through **v1.10.0**.\n\nThe vulnerable truncation logic was introduced in commit `ea1fa7ad1fdc` (\"Remote Resolution Refactor\"), first released in v0.60.0 (2024-05-22).\n\nCurrently supported affected releases:\n- **v1.10.x** (latest)\n- **v1.9.x** (LTS, EOL 2027-01-30)\n- **v1.6.x** (LTS, EOL 2026-10-31)\n- **v1.3.x** (LTS, EOL 2026-08-04)\n- **v1.0.x** (LTS, EOL 2026-04-29)\n\nReleases prior to v0.60.0 are **not affected** — the truncation code did not exist.\n\n### Acknowledgments\n\nThis vulnerability was reported by Oleh Konko (@1seal), who provided a thorough vulnerability analysis, proof-of-concept, and review of the fix. Thank you!\n\n### References\n\n- Fix: _(link to merged PR/commit)_\n- Introduced in: `ea1fa7ad1fdc` (\"Remote Resolution Refactor\")",
+  "details": "### Summary\n\nA user with permission to create or update a TaskRun or PipelineRun can crash the Tekton Pipelines controller by setting `.spec.taskRef.resolver` (or `.spec.pipelineRef.resolver`) to a string of 31 characters or more, causing a denial of service for all reconciliation.\n\n### Details\n\nThe controller panics in `GenerateDeterministicNameFromSpec` when building a deterministic `ResolutionRequest` name. The generated name has the format `{resolver}-{hash}` and, when the resolver name is long enough, the result exceeds the DNS-1123 label limit of 63 characters.\n\nThe truncation logic attempts to find a word boundary using `strings.LastIndex(name, \" \")`. Since the generated name never contains spaces (it is composed of the resolver name, a dash, and a hex-encoded hash), `LastIndex` returns `-1`, which is then used as a slice bound:\n\n```go\nreturn name[:strings.LastIndex(name[:maxLength], \" \")], nil\n// strings.LastIndex returns -1 → panic: slice bounds out of range [:-1]\n```\n\nThe panic crashes the controller. Because the offending TaskRun or PipelineRun is re-reconciled on restart, the controller enters a `CrashLoopBackOff`, blocking all TaskRun and PipelineRun reconciliation cluster-wide until the offending resource is manually deleted.\n\nBuilt-in resolvers use short names (`git`, `cluster`, `bundles`, `hub`) and are not affected under normal usage. The vulnerability is exploitable by any user who can create TaskRuns or PipelineRuns with a custom resolver name.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Denial of service** — A single malicious TaskRun or PipelineRun with a long resolver name is sufficient to crash the Tekton Pipelines controller into a restart loop, blocking all CI/CD reconciliation cluster-wide until the resource is removed.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in versions 1.0.1, 1.3.3, 1.6.1, 1.9.2, 1.10.2.\n\nThe fix computes the hash first, then truncates only the prefix (resolver name) to fit within the DNS-1123 label limit, preserving the full hash to maintain determinism and uniqueness of `ResolutionRequest` names.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict who can create TaskRun and PipelineRun resources via Kubernetes RBAC. There is no validation-side workaround without patching.\n\n### Affected Versions\n\nAll releases from **v0.60.0** through **v1.10.0**.\n\nThe vulnerable truncation logic was introduced in commit `ea1fa7ad1fdc` (\"Remote Resolution Refactor\"), first released in v0.60.0 (2024-05-22).\n\nCurrently supported affected releases:\n- **v1.10.x** (latest)\n- **v1.9.x** (LTS, EOL 2027-01-30)\n- **v1.6.x** (LTS, EOL 2026-10-31)\n- **v1.3.x** (LTS, EOL 2026-08-04)\n- **v1.0.x** (LTS, EOL 2026-04-29)\n\nReleases prior to v0.60.0 are **not affected** — the truncation code did not exist.\n\n### Acknowledgments\n\nThis vulnerability was reported by Oleh Konko (@1seal), who provided a thorough vulnerability analysis, proof-of-concept, and review of the fix. Thank you!\n\n### References\n\n- Fix (main): [5eead3f859b9](https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/commit/5eead3f859b9f938e86039e4d29185092c1d4ee6)\n- Fix (v1.10.x): [01673237c464](https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/commit/01673237c464cfac7e286183f5c9e9d6ec951a64)\n- Fix (v1.9.x): [edc64bbf2232](https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/commit/edc64bbf22323fcf218170f19047c9bcd8163e90)\n- Fix (v1.6.x): [0fa2d66cff81](https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/commit/0fa2d66cff814838c3a10cce252104c7fe618932)\n- Fix (v1.3.x): [5e4905fb6754](https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/commit/5e4905fb6754efa5ecea54de195738d73fb0e01d)\n- Fix (v1.0.x): [ebc197e2b973](https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/commit/ebc197e2b9733deedaa1624212ec66dcdf61eaaf)\n- Introduced in: `ea1fa7ad1fdc` (\"Remote Resolution Refactor\")\n",
   "severity": [
     {
       "type": "CVSS_V3",
@@ -28,11 +28,14 @@
               "introduced": "0.60.0"
             },
             {
-              "last_affected": "1.10.0"
+              "fixed": "1.0.1, 1.3.3, 1.6.1, 1.9.2, 1.10.2"
             }
           ]
         }
-      ]
+      ],
+      "database_specific": {
+        "last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 1.10.0"
+      }
     }
   ],
   "references": [