chore(deps): update dependency rack to v2.2.22 [security]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
rack (changelog)	2.2.21 → 2.2.22

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-22860

Summary

Rack::Directory’s path check used a string prefix match on the expanded path. A request like /../root_example/ can escape the configured root if the target path starts with the root string, allowing directory listing outside the intended root.

Details

In directory.rb, File.expand_path(File.join(root, path_info)).start_with?(root) does not enforce a path boundary. If the server root is /var/www/root, a path like /var/www/root_backup passes the check because it shares the same prefix, so Rack::Directory will list that directory also.

Impact

Information disclosure via directory listing outside the configured root when Rack::Directory is exposed to untrusted clients and a directory shares the root prefix (e.g., public2, www_backup).

Mitigation

• Update to a patched version of Rack that correctly checks the root prefix.
• Don't name directories with the same prefix as one which is exposed via Rack::Directory.

CVE-2026-25500

Summary

Rack::Directory generates an HTML directory index where each file entry is rendered as a clickable link. If a file exists on disk whose basename begins with the javascript: scheme (e.g. javascript:alert(1)), the generated index includes an anchor whose href attribute is exactly javascript:alert(1). Clicking this entry executes arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the hosting application.

This results in a client-side XSS condition in directory listings generated by Rack::Directory.

Details

Rack::Directory renders directory entries using an HTML row template similar to:

<a href='%s'>%s</a>

The %s placeholder is populated directly with the file’s basename. If the basename begins with javascript:, the resulting HTML contains an executable JavaScript URL:

<a href='javascript:alert(1)'>javascript:alert(1)</a>

Because the value is inserted directly into the href attribute without scheme validation or normalization, browsers interpret it as a JavaScript URI. When a user clicks the link, the JavaScript executes in the origin of the Rack application.

Impact

If Rack::Directory is used to expose filesystem contents over HTTP, an attacker who can create or upload files within that directory may introduce a malicious filename beginning with javascript:.

When a user visits the directory listing and clicks the entry, arbitrary JavaScript executes in the application's origin. Exploitation requires user interaction (clicking the malicious entry).

Mitigation

• Update to a patched version of Rack in which Rack::Directory prefixes generated anchors with a relative path indicator (e.g. ./filename).
• Avoid exposing user-controlled directories via Rack::Directory.
• Apply a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) to reduce impact of potential client-side execution issues.
• Where feasible, restrict or sanitize uploaded filenames to disallow dangerous URI scheme prefixes.

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Release Notes

rack/rack (rack)

v2.2.22

Compare Source

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[socket-security]

Review the following changes in direct dependencies. Learn more about Socket for GitHub.

Diff	Package	Supply Chain Security	Vulnerability	Quality	Maintenance	License
	rack@​2.2.21 ⏵ 2.2.22		+18

View full report