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Fix path injection in addons #5667

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Merged
RongGu merged 1 commit into from
Feb 15, 2026
Merged

Fix path injection in addons #5667

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24 changes: 24 additions & 0 deletions addons/glusterfs/docker/entrypoint.py
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,12 +1,36 @@
import json
import os
import re
import subprocess

obj = json.load(open("/etc/fluid/config/config.json"))

mount_point = obj["mounts"][0]["mountPoint"]
target_path = obj["targetPath"]

# Normalize first to resolve redundant separators, '.' and '..' components
target_path = os.path.normpath(target_path)

# Validate that the normalized path is an absolute POSIX path
if not os.path.isabs(target_path) or not target_path.startswith('/'):
print(f"Error: target_path must be absolute: {target_path}")
exit(1)

# Safety check: ensure no '..' components remain after normalization
if '..' in target_path.split('/'):
print(f"Error: Path traversal using '..' is not allowed in target_path: {target_path}")
exit(1)
Comment on lines +20 to +22
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Copilot AI Feb 14, 2026

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The path traversal check for '..' is performed before normalization. This creates a gap where paths like '/path/./subdir' or paths with multiple slashes would pass this check but might represent the same file system location as a path with '..'. While not directly a '..' bypass, checking before normalization means you're not validating the canonical form of the path. If normalization is moved to occur first (as suggested in another comment), this check can serve as a post-normalization safety check to catch any remaining '..' components, which should not exist in a properly normalized absolute path.

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# Validate that the path contains only safe characters
if not re.match(r'^[/a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$', target_path):
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@gemini-code-assist gemini-code-assist Bot Feb 12, 2026

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security-medium medium

The re module is used here (e.g., re.match() for target_path validation) but is not imported. This will cause a NameError: name 're' is not defined at runtime, leading to a crash and a Denial of Service (DoS) for the addon. Consequently, the intended security validation is never performed. Please add import re at the beginning of the file.

print(f"Error: target_path contains invalid characters: {target_path}")
exit(1)

# Prevent mounting on the root directory
if target_path == '/':
print("Error: target_path resolves to the root directory '/' and is not allowed.")
exit(1)
Comment on lines +12 to +32
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@gemini-code-assist gemini-code-assist Bot Feb 15, 2026

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security-medium medium

This section has critical vulnerabilities. The current root directory check can be bypassed using paths with double leading slashes (e.g., //), as os.path.normpath preserves these, allowing // to resolve to root despite not matching /. Additionally, the regex validation using the $ anchor can be bypassed by a trailing newline. Beyond these bypasses, the current checks do not prevent users from specifying arbitrary absolute paths like /etc or /usr/bin for target_path, which could lead to mounting volumes over sensitive system directories and potential container escapes. It is crucial to implement robust normalization, use re.fullmatch, and enforce that target_path is restricted to a designated safe base directory.

target_path = os.path.normpath(target_path)
if target_path.startswith('//') and not target_path.startswith('///'):
    target_path = '/' + target_path.lstrip('/')

# Validate that the normalized path is an absolute POSIX path
if not os.path.isabs(target_path) or not target_path.startswith('/'):
    print(f"Error: target_path must be absolute: {target_path}")
    exit(1)

# Safety check: ensure no '..' components remain after normalization
if '..' in target_path.split('/'):
    print(f"Error: Path traversal using '..' is not allowed in target_path: {target_path}")
    exit(1)

# Validate that the path contains only safe characters
if not re.fullmatch(r'^[/a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$', target_path):
    print(f"Error: target_path contains invalid characters: {target_path}")
    exit(1)

# Prevent mounting on the root directory
if target_path == '/':
    print("Error: target_path resolves to the root directory '/' and is not allowed.")
    exit(1)


os.makedirs(target_path, exist_ok=True)
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@gemini-code-assist gemini-code-assist Bot Feb 13, 2026

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high

The normalized target_path could become the root directory / (for example, if the input was /. or //). Mounting on the root directory is dangerous and should be explicitly prevented. Please add a check for this case before creating the directory.

if target_path == '/':
    print("Error: target_path resolves to the root directory '/' and is not allowed.")
    exit(1)
os.makedirs(target_path, exist_ok=True)


if len(mount_point.split(":")) != 2:
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