Update all dependencies by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #934 · commercetools/commercetools-sdk-java-v2

renovate · 2025-07-07T01:33:32Z

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Type	Update	Change
codecov/codecov-action	action	minor	`v5.4.3` → `v5.5.4`
github/codeql-action	action	minor	`v3.29.1` → `v3.35.2`
gradle (source)		patch	`8.14.2` → `8.14.4`
lint-staged	dependencies	minor	`16.1.2` → `16.4.0`
yarn (source)	packageManager	minor	`4.13.0` → `4.14.0`
org.mockito:mockito-junit-jupiter	dependencies	minor	`5.18.0` → `5.23.0`
com.google.guava:guava	dependencies	minor	`33.4.8-jre` → `33.6.0-jre`
org.assertj:assertj-core (source)	dependencies	patch	`3.27.3` → `3.27.7`
com.google.code.gson:gson	dependencies	patch	`2.13.1` → `2.13.2`
com.fasterxml.jackson.datatype:jackson-datatype-jsr310	dependencies	minor	`2.19.1` → `2.21.2`
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core	dependencies	minor	`2.19.1` → `2.21.1`
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind (source)	dependencies	minor	`2.19.1` → `2.21.2`
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-annotations (source)	dependencies	minor	`2.19.1` → `2.21`
com.netflix.graphql.dgs.codegen:graphql-dgs-codegen-shared-core	dependencies	minor	`8.3.0` → `8.4.3`
commons-io:commons-io (source)	dependencies	minor	`2.19.0` → `2.21.0`
io.netty:netty-codec (source)	dependencies	patch	`4.2.2.Final` → `4.2.12.Final`
org.apache.commons:commons-lang3 (source)	dependencies	minor	`3.18.0` → `3.20.0`
org.apache.commons:commons-text (source)	dependencies	minor	`1.13.1` → `1.15.0`
com.squareup.okio:okio	dependencies	minor	`3.14.0` → `3.17.0`
com.squareup.okio:okio	dependencies	minor	`3.16.2` → `3.17.0`
io.netty:netty-handler (source)	dependencies	patch	`4.2.2.Final` → `4.2.12.Final`
io.netty:netty-handler-proxy (source)	dependencies	patch	`4.2.2.Final` → `4.2.12.Final`
com.github.javaparser:javaparser-core (source)	dependencies	minor	`3.27.0` → `3.28.0`
io.netty:netty-codec-socks (source)	dependencies	patch	`4.2.2.Final` → `4.2.12.Final`
com.datadoghq:datadog-api-client	dependencies	minor	`2.38.0` → `2.53.0`
io.projectreactor.netty:reactor-netty-core	dependencies	minor	`1.2.8` → `1.3.5`
com.newrelic.agent.java:newrelic-api	dependencies	minor	`8.21.0` → `8.25.1`
io.opentelemetry:opentelemetry-api	dependencies	minor	`1.51.0` → `1.61.0`
com.datadoghq:java-dogstatsd-client	dependencies	patch	`4.4.4` → `4.4.5`
org.apache.httpcomponents.client5:httpclient5 (source)	dependencies	minor	`5.5` → `5.6`
io.projectreactor.netty:reactor-netty-http	dependencies	minor	`1.2.8` → `1.3.5`
com.netflix.dgs.codegen	plugin	minor	`8.3.0` → `8.4.3`
org.jetbrains.kotlin.jvm	plugin	minor	`2.2.0` → `2.3.20`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-24400

An XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability exists in org.assertj.core.util.xml.XmlStringPrettyFormatter: the toXmlDocument(String) method initializes DocumentBuilderFactory with default settings, without disabling DTDs or external entities. This formatter is used by the isXmlEqualTo(CharSequence) assertion for CharSequence values.

An application is vulnerable only when it uses untrusted XML input with one of the following methods:

isXmlEqualTo(CharSequence) from org.assertj.core.api.AbstractCharSequenceAssert
xmlPrettyFormat(String) from org.assertj.core.util.xml.XmlStringPrettyFormatter

Impact

If untrusted XML input is processed by the methods mentioned above (e.g., in test environments handling external fixture files), an attacker could:

Read arbitrary local files via file:// URIs (e.g., /etc/passwd, application configuration files)
Perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTTP/HTTPS URIs
Cause Denial of Service via "Billion Laughs" entity expansion attacks

Mitigation

isXmlEqualTo(CharSequence) has been deprecated in favor of XMLUnit in version 3.18.0 and will be removed in version 4.0. Users of affected versions should, in order of preference:

Replace isXmlEqualTo(CharSequence) with XMLUnit, or
Upgrade to version 3.27.7, or
Avoid using isXmlEqualTo(CharSequence) or XmlStringPrettyFormatter with untrusted input.

XmlStringPrettyFormatter has historically been considered a utility for isXmlEqualTo(CharSequence) rather than a feature for AssertJ users, so it is deprecated in version 3.27.7 and removed in version 4.0, with no replacement.

References

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:L/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq

Summary

The non-blocking (async) JSON parser in jackson-core bypasses the maxNumberLength constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in StreamReadConstraints. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).

The standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.

Details

The root cause is that the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.

The number parsing methods (e.g., _finishNumberIntegralPart) accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length checks.
After parsing, they call _valueComplete(), which finalizes the token but does not call resetInt() or resetFloat().
The resetInt()/resetFloat() methods in ParserBase are where the validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() checks are performed.
Because this validation step is skipped, the maxNumberLength constraint is never enforced in the async code path.

PoC

The following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.

package tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;

import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;

import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;

import tools.jackson.core.*;
import tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;
import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;
import tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;

import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;

/**
 * POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers
 *
 * Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos
 * 
 * maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).
 * A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.
 *
 * BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where
 * validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls
 * _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.
 *
 * CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
 */
class AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {

    private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;
    private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;

    private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();

    // CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength
    @&#8203;Test
    void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {
        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);
		
		// Output to console
        System.out.println("[SYNC] Parsing " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number (limit: " + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + ")");
        try {
            try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {
                while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                    if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                        System.out.println("[SYNC] Accepted number with " + p.getText().length() + " digits — UNEXPECTED");
                    }
                }
            }
            fail("Sync parser must reject a " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number");
        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
            System.out.println("[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: " + e.getMessage());
        }
    }

    // VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects
    @&#8203;Test
    void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {
        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);

        NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =
            (NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());
        p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);
        p.endOfInput();

        boolean foundNumber = false;
        try {
            while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                    foundNumber = true;
                    String numberText = p.getText();
                    assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),
                        "Async parser silently accepted all " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits");
                }
            }
            // Output to console
            System.out.println("[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits — BUG CONFIRMED");
            assertTrue(foundNumber, "Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token");
        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
            fail("Bug is fixed — async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: " + e.getMessage());
        }
        p.close();
    }

    private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {
        StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);
        sb.append("{\"v\":");
        for (int i = 0; i < numDigits; i++) {
            sb.append((char) ('1' + (i % 9)));
        }
        sb.append('}');
        return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
    }
}

Impact

A malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause:

Memory Exhaustion: Unbounded allocation of memory in the TextBuffer to store the number's digits, leading to an OutOfMemoryError.
CPU Exhaustion: If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS.

Suggested Remediation

The async parsing path should be updated to respect the maxNumberLength constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that _valueComplete() or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (resetInt() or resetFloat()) already present in ParserBase, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers.

NOTE: This research was performed in collaboration with rohan-repos

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Release Notes

codecov/codecov-action (codecov/codecov-action)

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renovate bot commented Jul 7, 2025 •

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