GatewayToHeaven Finding a Cross-Tenant Vulnerability in GCP'... #254
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
Post: “GatewayToHeaven: Finding a Cross-Tenant Vulnerability in GCP's Apigee” (published 2026-01-28). The author describes a multi-step exploit chain in Google Cloud Apigee (managed SaaS) that resulted in cross-tenant read/write access to Apigee analytics/logging artifacts across unrelated customers, including logs containing plaintext end-user access tokens. The issue was assigned CVE-2025-13292.
High-level outcome (why this matters)<...
🔧 Technical Details
SSRF to cloud metadata via configurable API gateways/proxies: If a gateway/proxy can be configured to forward requests to arbitrary backends, pointing the backend to
169.254.169.254can expose the workload’s metadata server and yield short-lived service-account tokens. If the platform injects SSRF-mitigation headers (e.g.,X-Forwarded-Forcausing metadata rejection), look for request-mutation stages/policies (e.g., ApigeeAssignMessage) that can remove/overwrite those headers before forwarding to the backend.Cloud IAM permission discovery after token theft: After obtaining a service-account token, systematically enumerate effective permissions using automated tooling (e.g., gcpwn) to find high-leverage primitives like disk snapshotting, bucket read/write, and Pub/Sub publishing that enable deeper compromise and pivoting.
GCP disk snapshot exfiltration for ...
🤖 Agent Actions
Updated
gcp-post-exploitation/README.mdwith a detailed Apigee-to-Dataflow cross-tenant exploitation chain: metadata SSRF bypass via AssignMessage header stripping, permission discovery with gcpwn, snapshot exfil for managed disks, Dataflow JAR replacement and GCS-based exfil, Pub/Sub-driven autoscaling trigger, and the shared bucket path flaw enabling cross-tenant analytics access. Added references to the source blog and Apigee AssignMessage policy docs.This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.