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| 1 | +## Title |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | +InnerSource Incentives and Disincentives |
| 4 | + |
| 5 | +## Patlet |
| 6 | + |
| 7 | +Lack of awareness for incentives as well well as disincentives for InnerSource contribution decrease the chances of an InnerSource project receiving contributions; this is addressed by sharing a comprehensive list of potential incentives and disincentives. |
| 8 | + |
| 9 | +## Problem |
| 10 | + |
| 11 | +Soliciting contributions to an InnerSource project in a corporate environment, where every potential contributor is fully utilized is a difficult task. |
| 12 | +Contribution will likely contribute only, if there is an incentive for them to do so and if disincentives are absent. |
| 13 | +Without awareness of these incentives and disincentives, a maintainer will likely face challenges actively soliciting contributions. |
| 14 | +It is important for Trusted Committers to be aware of and advertise incentives for potential contributors. |
| 15 | + |
| 16 | +## Context |
| 17 | + |
| 18 | +* Potential contributors in a corporate environment are most likely fully utilized and have no "free" time to contribute to InnerSource projects, especially when they are not directly related to their work. |
| 19 | +* Especially in early stages of InnerSource adoption, potential contributors as well as inexperienced Trusted Committers might not be aware of the incentives of InnerSource contribution. |
| 20 | + |
| 21 | +## Forces |
| 22 | + |
| 23 | +* The more awareness a Trusted Committer has for the potential incentives and disincentives for InnerSource contribution, the more likely will they be able to successfully advertise them and successfully solicit contributions. |
| 24 | +* The higher the incentive to contribute to an InnerSource project, the more likely it will receive contributions. |
| 25 | +* The more potential contributors are aware of incentives for InnerSource contribution, the more likely is their contribution. |
| 26 | +* Even small disincentives will likely deter potential contributors to contribute. |
| 27 | + |
| 28 | +## Solutions |
| 29 | + |
| 30 | +The incentives and disincentives for InnerSource contribution depend on the concrete organizational context of the InnerSource program. |
| 31 | +This pattern provides a list of potential incentives and disincentives for InnerSource contribution, which allows both Trusted Committers and potential Contributors to quickly assess, which incentives and disincentives are present in their concrete context. |
| 32 | +These are listed in alphabetical order in the following two sections. |
| 33 | + |
| 34 | +### Potential Incentives |
| 35 | + |
| 36 | +* **Achieving mastery** in your craft |
| 37 | +* **Autonomy** in how contributions are crafted |
| 38 | +* **Collaboration with like-minded people** |
| 39 | +* **Free stuff**, such as e. g. free CI/CD infrastructure |
| 40 | +* Help other people **grow personally**, specifically as a Trusted Committer |
| 41 | +* **Intellectual Challenge** |
| 42 | +* **Making work easier/more productive/more fun** for yourself and your peers |
| 43 | +* **Personal mobility** within the organization, e. g. by collaboration with peers outside of your team, gaining visibility and the opportunity to move to different areas of the organization |
| 44 | +* **Sense of Impact** of ones contribution inside and outside of the organization |
| 45 | +* **Showcasing your successes** and receiving feedback and appreciation |
| 46 | +* **Time to contribute**, so that contributions can be made during working hours |
| 47 | + |
| 48 | +### Potential Disincentives |
| 49 | + |
| 50 | +* **Absence or lack of free, essential development infrastructure** such as e. g. CI/CD infrastructure |
| 51 | +* **Conflicting InnerSource related goals or incentives in the leadership hierarchy** leading to ambiguity and dissatisfaction by all parties involved in InnerSource |
| 52 | +* **For managers: high transparency for their peers in how the managers staff contributes to InnerSource projects**, especially when there is financial pressure and a significant amount of contributions are made outside of their "silo" and leading to local optimization |
| 53 | +* **Local optimization**, impeding contributions to "non-local" projects (different silo) |
| 54 | +* **Monetary rewards** for knowledge workers (see [RSA Animate on Motivation (by Dan Pink)](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6XAPnuFjJc)) |
| 55 | +* **No or lack of time to contribute during working hours**, resulting in InnerSource being on-top effort |
| 56 | +* **Too much freedom**, resulting in fragmentation and lack of orientation and alignment |
| 57 | + |
| 58 | +## Resulting Context |
| 59 | + |
| 60 | +Both Trusted Committers and (potential) Contributors are aware of the _potential_ incentives and disincentives for InnerSource contribution. |
| 61 | +They can assess which incentives and disincentives are present in their context and thus make an informed and balanced decision, whether or not to contribute. |
| 62 | +It is less likely that potential contributors don't contribute due to unawareness of incentives. |
| 63 | +Trusted Committers can actively leverage incentives when soliciting contributions. |
| 64 | + |
| 65 | +## Known Instances |
| 66 | + |
| 67 | +TBD |
| 68 | + |
| 69 | +## Authors |
| 70 | + |
| 71 | +* Georg Grütter (Robert Bosch GmbH) |
| 72 | + |
| 73 | +## Status |
| 74 | + |
| 75 | +* Initial |
| 76 | +* Drafted at the InnerSource Gathering Berlin 2025 |
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